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Published On: 2 May 2024

Litigious father banned from further family court applications

A father has been banned from making any further applications to the family court without special permission, until his three children respectively turn 16. They are currently aged between six and 11 years old.

The unusually lengthy ban was made at the request of the children’s mother, under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. This states:

“…the court may …order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.”

This clause allows judges to prevent vexatious or obsessive litigants in family disputes from wasting court time and resources, and offers protection to those on the ‘receiving end’ of any applications those individuals may otherwise make.

The father in question had an extensive history of litigation, with no less than ten court judgements available online. The section 91(14) ban followed yet another court appearance, in which the he sought to make changes to a child arrangements order.

In addition to the multiple court cases, the father was also in the habit of sending lengthy emails to the court during the proceedings. In the Liverpool Family Court, His Honour Judge Greensmith recalled:

“He has sent many emails (around 25) to the court which he has asked to be referred to myself. These have invariably been long (several pages of A4 in close type) and complex emails which the court staff have been required to refer to me…Having received the emails, I have been compelled to read them as I had to establish if a response was necessary. Each letter has taken well over an hour of court and judicial time which could have been better spent on other cases.”

The father had also made three separate attempts to appeal decisions made by Judge Greensmith to the High Court, each one dismissed as “totally without merit”. High Court Judge Sir Jonathan Cohen had warned him that any further attempts by the father could result in a restraining order.

Judge Greensmith noted:

“The father has a diagnosis of autism. This gives rise to two considerations relevant to this application. Firstly it has resulted in participation directions which have proved difficult to arrange and which have involved a considerable use of court resources. All hearings have been held remotely with the father in the court building in a room reserved for [him]… This accommodation has been difficult to arrange as small conference rooms were deemed inappropriate. The final hearing was conducted with the father located in the court’s main conference / meeting room making it unavailable for its usual use …for the entire week. During hearings the father would frequently say has was having an autistic meltdown which caused adjournments and further delays.”

All three of the father’s children were neurodivergent: two were autistic and the third had been tested for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). This made the siblings even more vulnerable than other children. The father believed that this own autism would make him the better parent, but the court was not convinced. The Judge declared:

“It is not the concern of this court how the father conducts his own affairs where his conduct does not affect the welfare of the children. However, where the conduct does affect the welfare of the children the court has a duty to take whatever protective measures it can. Where there is conflict between the rights of the father and the children … I give priority to those of the children. Whenever children are engaged in litigation it has an adverse effect on their welfare. It is an adverse childhood experience. To be involved in prolonged litigation between waring parents is likely to cause significant harm.”

He concluded:

“Having the children’s welfare as my paramount consideration it is in my judgment necessary and proportionate to make an order as asked by the mother. I fear that if an order were made for any period less than each child reaching the age of sixteen it would not be sufficient to serve their welfare throughout their childhood. The purpose of this order is primarily to avoid the children being put at further risk of harm.”

Jeremy Ford, one of the partners here at Cambridge Family Law Practice, notes: “Whilst the court will often do what it can to support neurodiverse parties, there is a limit to resources, as everyone involved in the family court system will be aware of. Further, the stress on the children and their mother (and no doubt the father himself) of persistent and repeated litigation will be exhausting. The court clearly felt it had to make a stand.”

Case citation: Re X (Children) [2024] EWFC 62 (B) (15 March 2024)

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